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LITERACY AND THE COMMON LAW
A Polytechnical Approach to the History of Writings of the Law
David Saunders*
This article proposes a 'polytechnical' approach to the history of
writings of law, with specific attention to the written texts of the
early common law. Such an approach is differentiated on the one
hand from a philosophical anthropology - here associated with
the work of Jack Goody - that imputes an inevitable
'rationalising' consequence to writing, both scribal and print. On
the other hand, a polytechnical approach is differentiated also
from a cultural historicism - here associated with the work of
Peter Goodrich - that sets the history of law's writings into a
dialectical and critical cast. The literate techniques of the English
Jacobean lawyer Thomas Egerton are cited to illustrate why a
polytechnical approach offers descriptive and historical
advantages as a less normative approach to the history of legal
writing systems.
We must not be wise above what is written, or more precise than the
lawyers of the age.'
Approaches to Writings of the Law
In the first volume of The Sources of Social Power, Michael Mann itemises 28
'social inventions' that from pre-historical times to the seventeenth century
'have crucially increased power capacities'. 2 Among these inventions are
written law codes, diffuse (or discursive) literacy and printing. This inclusion
encourages exploration of the historical relations between literacy, both scribal
and print, and the ordering, regularisation or 'codification' of law.
In this article, my specific concern is with approaches to the historical
role of writing in the regularisation of the English common law. The scope is
limited: to outline an approach to legal writings that rests neither on a
philosophical anthropology treating human rationality as a unitary autonomous
process of which rational attributes such as abstract thought are the necessary
manifestation, nor on a cultural historicist mode of dialectical thinking about
human development as the progressive resolution of opposing forces, the
tensions between which are played out in the form of a dualistic cultural
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2 Mann (1986), p 525.
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history. These two lines of approach to the writing of the law - exemplified
respectively in the work of Jack Goody3 and Peter Goodrich 4 - are examined
in the second and third sections.
In the fourth section, I present what I term a 'polytechnical' approach to
the writing of the law. At issue are the variable relations of law and legal
institutions to a cultural technology such as literacy, unevenly distributed
across human populations and susceptible to a multiplicity of instrumental
ends. There is no reason to anticipate that exploration of the cultural context of
law implies either a reduction of law to one extra-legal determinant - be this
divine will, humankind's social nature or the forces of the market - or a
restoration of the legal enterprise to some moral foundation in a 'higher law'
embodied in a history of culture. By way of material illustration for a
polytechnical approach, I consider the writings of the early common law,
together with a particular instance: the literate techniques employed by a
Jacobean jurist, Thomas Egerton, later Lord Ellesmere and Chancellor under
the Stuart king James VI and I. Egerton's work on legal texts is briefly
presented in the fifth section.
A Rationalist Anthropology of Writing and Law: Jack Goody
In effect, a polytechnical approach is already well and truly practised in
existing legal historiography. Plucknett's Early English Legal Literature5 and
Abbott's Law Reporting in England, 1485-1585' examine aspects of legal
writing and literate production that will be considered below. These historians
do not approach their topics from a perspective that views writing as having
inevitable consequences for law. Conversely, Goody's anthropological
approach construes literacy precisely in an essential relation to an alleged
human potential: the potential for rational abstract thought. This is to treat
literacy as if it already contained within itself the seeds of all its consequences,
whether a rationalisation of life in general or, more specifically, a definite
historical and cultural process such as the ordering and regularisation of law.
My approach is more modest, but therefore not original. As well as
respecting the established legal historiography, it also follows Natalie Zemon
Davis's (1975) lesson that the history of literacy has no one inevitable
direction, that people do not just read, and that access to literate culture does
not necessarily transform lives for better or for worse. 7 Different 'milieux' - a
key term for Davis - have given individuals and groups different practical
reasons for acquiring or not acquiring literacy. Having acquired literacy, they
have used it in different ways. In a given cultural milieu, literacy might
enhance what could count as rationality and abstract thought, but it might
equally well cement a belief in angels or establish a market in written
3 Goody (1986, 1987).
4 Goodrich (1986, 1987a, 1987b).
5 Plucknett (1958).
6 Abbott (1973).
7 See Davis (1975).
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pornography. This is not to doubt that a technological and cultural factor such
as the dissemination of printed law books was a key condition for the greater
ordering of law. Rather, it is to suggest that ordering and regularisation were
due to more circumstantial factors than some irresistible rationalising power
intrinsic to writing and print.
To judge by his statement of intent in 'The Letter of the Law', Goody's
project is comprehensive as far as law is concerned:
to consider ... how far the concept of law itself is influenced by the
presence of writing, then to go on to discuss its [writing's] relation to
the logic (or rationality), the procedures, the institutions and the content
of law.
8
Goody's inquiry takes the form of a comparative cultural impact study of the
effects of writing on law in a newly literate and an older literate society: the
contemporary LoDagaa of Northern Ghana and Medieval Europe. For all the
historical separation and geographical distance between these settings, these
effects are approached as grounded in a general rational nature of man, taken
to underlie the different contexts. Writing as information-storage thus
'enhances the potentialities of the human mind', whilst 'reading permits ... a
greater degree of objectification which increases the analytical potential of the
human mind'. 9 Conceptualised in these terms, the writing of the law can be
connected up directly with this alleged potential for rationality and abstract
thought: 'the creation of the legal text involves a formalisation (eg a
numbering of the laws), a universalisation (eg an extension of their range by
the elimination of particulars) and an ongoing rationalisation'.10 Moreover,
legal ordering can now be treated as a general effect of writing, and detached
from the specific circumstances of different literate techniques and their
variable historical distributions in different cultural contexts. In this way,
despite recognising that English common law did not derive from Roman civil
law, Goody can transcend the mere difference of jurisdictions in order to
uncover a deeper process of literate 'codification' in both." Even a specific
category of legal text such as the written contract can thus be represented as a
flow-on from the general developmental tendency or 'potential of the human
mind' towards abstraction, a tendency of which the written contract becomes
the paradigmatic manifestation:
The importance of writing in the form of the contract, the elaboration of
the notion [of contract] through a process of 'abstraction', through the
8 Goody (1986), p 127.
9 Goody (1986), pp 136, 142.
10 Goody (1986), p 126.
1" See Goody (1986), p 130: 'there was the code based on the Roman model as
distinct from the codification by statute of English law, both employing writing in
the creation of a code, but in rather different ways'.
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making of 'an abstract' ... is clear and the case stands as a paradigm of
the uses of literacy in social and intellectual development.12
For all its explanatory appeal, this bringing together of literacy and law on
the ground of a human potential for abstraction and rational thinking leads to
an evident ambivalence: on the one hand, law is represented as the effect of a
general rationalising power of literacy; on the other, the law when written is
taken as the particular cause, in its own right, of the rationalisation and
objectification of social life, as the agency that displaces custom and oral
memory.
In an earlier study on the consequences of literacy, co-authored with the
literary historian Ian Watt, Goody embraced just such a general relation
between the spread of literacy and the emergence of abstract rationality.'
3
Goody is not alone, then, in holding to this strong anthropological approach.
There is also the Jesuit scholar Walter Ong, who accords literacy the role of
allowing a global human capacity for abstract thinking to be realised - albeit
at the cost of withdrawing the literate individual from the immediacy of
orality, dialogue and the communal 'lifeworld'.1 4 We begin to see the moral -
and perhaps the theological - dimension of this social anthropology. In
subsequent work, Goody appeared to qualify his earlier position, now arguing
that the effect of writing 'upon cultural systems was never everywhere the
same. Rather it varies according to the social circumstances and the type of
system employed for the visual representation of language.' 15 Indeed, there
seems to be an explicit revision of the earlier approach:
In any case, I do not have an overall theory that determines each
particular hypothesis but simply a topic for enquiry, which seems to
produce answers, perhaps partial, to intellectual questions. Watt and I
considered calling our original article 'A Theory of Literacy', but
rejected it in favour of 'consequences'. By 1968 I had preferred
'implications' for the first term and more recently 'writing' for the
second. 16
As if in direct disregard of his own disclaimer, just two pages earlier in
this 1987 Preface to The Interface between the Written and the Oral Goody
refers precisely to 'the inevitable consequence of literacy, its role as a
reductive instrument'. 17 For the present article, it is not without relevance that
12 Goody (1986), p 146.
13 Goody and Watt (1963). For a critical discussion of Goody's approach to literacy,
see Street (1984), pp 44-65. For Street: 'The most influential presentation of the
"strong" version of the "autonomous" model [of literacy] has probably been that
of the social anthropologist, Jack Goody.' (p 44) According to Street, Goody's
approach assumes 'inherent qualities of the written work'.
14 Ong (1982).
15 Goody (1987), p ix.
16 Goody (1987), p xvii.
17 Goody (1987), p xv.
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in Goody's account the 'inevitable consequence' flows from a set of literate
instruments - registration, mortgages, courts - that are legal in character,
even if they are far from being 'inevitable' features of every human culture.
Also significant is the fact that in The Logic of Writing and the Organisation of
Society Goody's major source for evidence on the early common law is
Clanchy's study of the transition from an oral form of memorisation to the
keeping of written records.' 8 Clanchy treats this transition in terms of an
epochal shift from a state of orality to a state of literacy, from one mentality or
collective consciousness to another. There is little sign here of Natalie Davis's
capacity for discrimination between particular literate milieux.
In short, while welcoming Goody's formulation of notions such as
'technology of the intellect' 19 to describe literacy, both scribal and print, we
might regret the social anthropologist's lack of attention to the specific
agencies involved in the establishment of literate interests and the
dissemination of literate capacities, not to mention the variability of literacy's
effects. For the sake of argument, and notwithstanding Goody's 'retraction', I
shall therefore refer to approaches 'in the style of Goody' as a generic tag for
anthropological perspectives that attribute to writing an intrinsic rationalising
power.
A Cultural Dialectic of Writing and Law: Peter Goodrich
In 'Literacy and the Languages of the Early Common Law', Peter Goodrich
offers an account of the discursive relations of the common law organised, as
noted above, within a cultural-historicist frame and grounded in the notion of
dialectical development. It is the classic approach of dialectical critique. At
first sight, Goodrich avoids precisely the implication of a uniform
'consequence of literacy' that can mark a rationalist-anthropological- approach
in the style of Goody. In fact, in the case of the common law, writing produced
anything but a law unified in its rational abstraction:
Varied in its languages and frequently distrustful in its recourse to
writing, the common law tradition is something of a limiting instance in
the history of legal texts. Prone as it has been to recollecting a myth of
spoken and accessible customary law and to berating the incursion of
foreign scripts and alien law, the mixed character of English law is
fertile ground, both in doctrine and practice, for the analysis of
conflicting literacies and competing groups of literati.2°
Such talk of linguistic variety and such excitement at conflicting literacies
could have no place in the unifying approach to literacy as the pliant
instrument of rationality and abstraction. Nor is this any loss, in Goodrich's
estimation:
18 See Clanchy (1979).
19 Goody (1986), p 167.
20 Goodrich (1987b), p 422.
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The writings of the common law tradition, in contrast to the civilian
doctrine of ratio scripta, at least have the benefit of never having been
uniformly presented as an unequivocal unity. Their history and
reception was consistently one of conflict between different institutions
of confinement and of opposed schools of interpretation. The languages
of record were from the beginning politically charged while the
production, storage, and utility of legal documentation was the object of
continuing dispute.21
But this is only the pretext for a critique of a common law which, despite its
energising conflicts, now falls under suspicion as itself an 'institution of
confinement':
There is, indeed, little evidence of legal writing being received as an
unmitigated cultural good or as self-evidently rational, and it is in such
a context that it seems more immediately appropriate to raise the
questions not only of who wrote, but also of where such writings were
located, by whom were they protected, and to what public did they
speak?
22
The questions could presage investigations of particular political and cultural
circumstances. However, as things turn out, reconstruction of the contextual
specifics of early common law writings is constrained by an organising
historicism and its attendant image of an ideal cultural development.
Goodrich gives his game away by adopting as the standard of comparison
for the common law tradition a mythic image of republican Rome where laws
and other literary works are read to an assembled public 'neither exclusively
Roman nor simply patrician' and where 'the life of the literary community as
in any way an active institution was everywhere tied to its involvement in the
form of both social and military policy'. 21 In a representation that would have
pleased Marx, literary culture - and, with it, legal literacy - is here swept up
into the material ground of social relations as law and community, state and
society are reconciled in an exemplary unity of opposites. Yet the suspicion
remains that this is more an aesthetic projection than a historical
reconstruction. What Goodrich calls 'Rome' is simply another name for what
Friedrich Schiller - at the end of the eighteenth century - called 'Greece'. In
his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, the German philosopher had
already depicted the latter place as one where 'the senses and the mind had still
no strictly separate individualities', unlike the 'modern' epoch, where this
ideal harmonisation had been displaced by:
an ingenious piece of machinery, in which out of the botching together
of a vast number of lifeless parts, a collective mechanical life results.
21 Goodrich (1987b), p 422.
22 Goodrich (1987b), p 422.
23 Goodrich (1987b), p 437.
SAUNDERS: LITERACY AND THE COMMON LAW 73
State and Church, law and customs, were now torn asunder; enjo ,ment
was separated from labour, means from ends, effort from reward.
21
Such terms, like those in Schiller's further characterisation of the modern age
as one in which the 'lifeless letter takes the place of the living understanding',
could perfectly well do duty for Goodrich's 'epoch' of the early common law.
Along with this Romantic vision and critique, Goodrich borrows from the
literary theory of Mikhail Bakhtin the then widely talked-of notion of a
'dialogic imagination'. 25 This discursive entity is set in counter-position to a
'monologic' character imputed to the early common law (despite the latter's
'mixed character' and 'conflicting literacies'). The critical intention is now
quite clear: to construct an exemplary contrast between the common law
writings as an 'institution of confinement' and an ideal 'other' culture where:
the written sign bore with it a more complex array of awe and play, of
an exegesis but also a hedonism of discursive signification more closely
allied to allegory and mask than to scholastic certainties or the
grammarian's truth.
26
With great constancy of critical purpose, Goodrich has continued since the
1980s to articulate an undiminished commitment to this aesthetic of play and
pleasure. The continuity is clear in his recent eulogy of a rhetorical approach to
law:
A critical rhetoric of law, or in a more adventurous coinage a rhetoric
that 'plays' the law, is precisely one that attends to 'the other scene' of
legal communication and specifically to the plastic supports, medial
relays, textual and visual effects of legal rule. 27
The target remains the same: a univocal writing of law that has served to mask
the written law's contingency as a sacral necessity, an icon inviting worship
not critical inspection. Thus: 'The writing of law, whether in the form of an
edict, a contract, a doom, or a code, turned the transitivity and ephemerality of
speech into the intransitive, sepulchral, and sacred form of the written sign.
' 28
In this account, the 'exorbitant status' accorded to law promulgated in written
form becomes the pretext for the critic to manoeuvre legal institutions into his
24 Schiller (1968), p 40. Schiller had previously characterised the modem age as that
time when the 'governed cannot but receive with indifference the laws which are
scarcely, if at all, directed to them as persons' (p 37).
25 Goodrich (1987b), pp 432, 436. Goodrich also sets himself under the sign of
Derrida, although the dialectical critique demands that writing and speech be set in
opposition - 'confinement in writing' as opposed to 'living concerns' (p 422) or
'bookish confinement' as opposed to 'a living discourse and a spoken truth'. This
does not sit easily alongside Derrida's anti-logocentrism in Of Grammatology.
26 Goodrich (1987b), p 436.
27 Goodrich (2001b), p 424.
28 Goodrich (2001b), p 422.
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sights as if they had the oppressive fixity of theologically revered dogmas.
29
Granted a dogmatics of law, the point nonetheless has to be made: historically
speaking, Western law and religion have had quite different ends - the one
pursuing peace and civil order in this life, the other salvation in the next. Many
more have died for the cause of religion, many fewer for the cause of law.
30
This important issue aside, the identification of legal writing systems as
the core topic in the study of law's material history now provides the platform
for a legal 'grammatology':
The first lesson of legal grammatology is philological and historical.
Grammatology attends to the corpus iuris, to the specific body or text of
law, and examines it in the plenitude of its language and the complexity
of its contexts or marks. The history of law is a history of writing -
texts and other signs are all that remain. They are the law.
3
'
But the story does not end here. Legal writing systems - the object of
this specialist and scholarly grammatology - were and are never innocent of
power play. In consequence, an ethically informed teaching should embody 'a
recognition and responsibility for the part that lawyers play in the symbolic
and real violence of law'. 32 Drawing now from Jacques Derrida rather than
Bakhtin, and thus becoming more Talmudic than German-dialectical,
Goodrich recommends not only the slow and infinitely patient decanting of the
verbal texts that are law's history; he also more futuristically contemplates the
scriptural transformation occasioned - as he sees it - by the 'videosphere'.
33
Today's new media mean 'a new law, a new mode of access to law, a new
form of dissemination of law, and so necessarily a revision of the meaning of
legality' .34
29 See Goodrich (2001b), pp 423, 424: 'the dogmatic rhetoric of a truth or necessary
logic of written law has borrowed significantly from theological dogmatics ...
theology and jurisprudence should not be thought of as separate disciplines'.
30 See Saunders (1997).
31 Goodrich (2001a), p 2033.
32 Goodrich (2001a), p 2068.
33 The evidence of transformation is drawn from American media coverage of the
Rodney King and OJ Simpson trials. The several 'trials of the century' thus 'raise
first the simple need to acknowledge, at last, the advent of new forms of visibility
and of the social presence of law ... The law has now become manifestly itinerant,
but in a new sense - one in which its relays are as much the subject of media
constraints, the genres of spectacle or viewing, as they are the obedient servants of
the lawyer's message. Law as the interior narrative of an arcane professional
understanding was now displaced by widely publicised dramas and by a vast
network of commentary and relay sites. The law became instantaneous, and the
public presence of law was taken out of the exclusive and solemn or learned hands
of the lawyers and passed down, as with the Supreme Court judgment in Bush v
Gore, to waiting reporters who would read and interpret it live on camera.'
(Goodrich, 2001a, p. 2075, footnotes omitted)
34 Goodrich (2001a), p. 2078.
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At all events, Goodrich in critical mode has been eager to score every
possible point against the common lawyers and their writings. In his 1980s
studies, the early common law is thus criticised not only for its formalism and
linguistic closure, but also for an anti-popular alignment with royal power and
church authorities:
The royal law that became the early and curiously-named 'common'
law was devised not by the express will of the people (voluntas populi)
but by clerics employed by the crown and trained in canon and Roman
law. Owing more to the Latin tradition and the role of the aristocracy
than to vernacular traditions, the rapidly formalised writing of the early
common law soon sedimented in ritual patterns, in verbose Latin
statutes, Latin plea rolls, writs and formularies.
35
The critique is extended beyond the hampering instance of law Latin to
encompass all and every linguistic constraint. The lawyers drawing on Latinate
literacy are identified with 'the grammarians who would translate the
[Romans'] military subjection of the imperial territories into the requirements
of a dominant discourse: the regularity and obedience demanded by fixed texts
and invariant rules of spelling and syntax' 36 - as if there could be discourses
without limits, without a measure of regularity or grammar, and at least some
public authority.
Yet, dialectically speaking, if unitary closure was a failing, so too was its
opposite: linguistic diversity. The common law writings are therefore also
indicted as the mongrel product of a linguistic miscegenation involving Latin,
French and English, resulting in a 'style [that] reflected all the pomposity and
prolixity of a register which happily used synonyms drawn from three eras and
communities of language where one could have served much better'. 37 Here
the new alleged problem is a polydiscursivity that prevented any deployment
for administrative purposes of twelfth and thirteenth century writings 'cross-
cut by earlier traditions of symbolisation and reporting'. 38 The fourteenth and
fifteenth century Year Book reports are likewise found deficient for being
'subject to no systematic tabulation or indexing'. 39 Magna Carta too is
criticised, being 'treasured not as an administrative utility but as a benefit or
concession, a magical relic belonging in a loose sense to the early museum, the
sepulchral home in which the right of might was mysteriously transformed in
the face of history, in legal title'.40 Conversely, law Latin is denounced as a
mode of writing 'geared to administrative and legal needs, a writing-system
concerned with the profane requirements of organising and subjugating the
35 Goodrich (1987b), p 431.
36 Goodrich (1987b), p 432.
37 Goodrich (1987b), p 435.
38 Goodrich (1987b), p 429. On the hybrid forms (and functions) of legal texts in this
period, see Stock (1983), pp 34-87.
39 Goodrich (1987b), p 429.
40 Goodrich (1987b), p 439.
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imperial territories'. 4 1 In other words, the early common law writings are
depicted as, at one and the same time, insufficiently legal to be proper and
authoritative law yet too legal to be properly dialogic and popular.
In relation to a legal field where literacy connoted literate competences in
particular institutional offices, however, Goodrich is surely right to view such
competences as 'too complex to be covered by a uniform concept of the ability
to read and write, however such skills are defined'.42 This is a crucial counter
to overly unifying approaches in the style of Goody. On the other hand, the
polemical imperative to tar all lawyers, then as now, with the same critical
brush overrides recognition of the alterity of a medieval legal organisation that,
at Goodrich's hands, is charged with the same shortcomings - formalism,
doctrinalism, elitism, complicity with an oppressive establishment - that
critical legal studies levels at law today. The Latinate literacy of the Anglo-
Norman 'administrative' state becomes the target of that habitual critique
directed at modern bureaucracy. 43 The early common law writings are thus
said to have failed to realise a 'dialogic' potential, remaining instead the
oppressive instrument of 'scholastics [who] increasingly reduced [i t to a set of
technical rules, to authoritarian formal grammars of correct usage'.
This is not the place to argue the case for correct usage, or even to ask
what an absence of grammar would mean in practice. The important thing is to
take seriously the varied elements of early common law literacy that Goodrich
correctly signals. After all, while using a Latinate writing, the common
lawyers nonetheless established a national territorial jurisdiction that a
continental legal historian such as Raoul van Caenegem can find so distinctive
in its long advance on developments in other European countries.45 Other
questions arise. If we accept Goodrich's equating of law Latin and law French
as merely 'non-vernacular', how can we recognise the distinctiveness of a
work such as Britton, the first book of the common law written not in Latin but
in law French? It might be better to see law French as 'the vernacular of the
courts' ,46 and to note that Britton was for long a book in demand - indeed,
one of the first law books to be put into print. If the Year Books had no
41 Goodrich (1987b), p 428.
42 Goodrich (1987b), p. 425.
43 One would want the critics of bureaucracy at least to note Max Weber's
observation: 'Independent decision-making and imaginative organisational
capabilities in matters of detail are usually also demanded of the bureaucrat, and
very often expected even in large matters. The idea that the bureaucrat is absorbed
in subaltern routine and that only the "director" performs the interesting,
intellectually demanding tasks is a preconceived notion of the literati and only
possible in a country that has no insight into the manner in which its affairs and
the workings of its officialdom are conducted.' See Weber (1978), p 1404.
44 Goodrich (1987b), p 427.
45 Caenegem (1959), pp 358-59. Another continental historian of jurisprudence to
make a similar comment is Stromholm (1985), p 182. On the 'juridical unification'
of England as a state under the rule of law, see the French political philosopher,
Blandine Kriegel (1995), pp 72-78.
46 The phrase is from Windeyer (1957), p 102.
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systematic indexing or tabulation, was this not because these particular literate
devices were as yet generally unavailable? Was there really, in twelfth and
thirteenth century England, a voluntas populi organised in such a way that
made 'the people' capable of discussing, let alone writing, practicable laws?
As for a 'vernacular' English legal writing, what could be written in
'English' at that time? What sort of literate apparatus - dictionaries,
grammars, rhetorics, literary models and exempla, curricula and schooling -
was needed for an English vernacular to emerge and be routinely used? In fact,
where a lexical resource for vernacular literacies is concemed,.it is only in the
sixteenth century that 'crude and incomplete dictionaries [of English] begin to
'47appear' . These were in the form of glossaries of selected terms of interest. By
1565, there is Thomas Cooper's Thesaurus Linguae Romanae et Britannicae,
itself in Latin, like other manuals for rhetorical inkhorns seeking to latinise
English into an acceptable level of public eloquence. Robert Cawdrey's 1604
A Table of Alphabetical English Words is still essentially a glossary. For the,48
'first dictionary in anything like the proper sense of the word', we have to
wait for John Kersey's Dictionarium Anglo-Britannicum, or A General
English Dictionary in 1708.49
If the early common law was being formalised in law Latin and law
French, it was perhaps because even at the end of the fourteenth century, the
East Midland dialect of English was still only 'an embryonic written
standard' .5 The development of an acknowledged written standard was
contingent on the emergence, from the late 1300s, of a class of professional
scribes working in secular scriptoria. 51 From around 1430, East Midland - a
class dialect spoken in London by the merchant stratum - began to become
the dominant non-Latin and non-French written form, being adopted in
government and commercial documents. Yet as Leith stresses, the emergence
of East Midland as a standard for writing in English did not imply linguistic
homogeneity. A telling instance is that of Chaucer who, 'while [he] wrote in
the east midland dialect as it was spoken in London ... was not yet writing in a
national literary standard, since his contemporaries had their own local
standards' .52 Rather than an upsurge of a written vernacular sustained by a
vivid popular speech, it was the development of printing and the book trade
from the mid-1400s that contributed to establishing an a standard written
English.
With regard to legal writing in England, there is also the factor of the
common law's cultural setting. Legal literacy as a phenomenon of culture and
a professional instrument was transmitted not in the theology-dominated
47 Wrenn (1952), p 98.
48 Wrenn (1952), p 99.
49 Samuel Johnson's celebrated Dictionary of the English Language was completed
in 1755. On the history of written English, see also Bolton (1972), pp 42-53, and
Harris (1980).
50 Leith (1983), p 39.
51 Leith (1983), p 38.
52 Leith (1983), p 40.
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universities, but in the London ambience of the Inns of Court. 53 Goodrich
dismisses the latter with a derisive reference to 'the aristocratic parlour-game
disputations of the Inns of Court'. 54 Yet, if they were centres only of such
trivia, why did the legal formation of the common lawyers in the Inns of Court
not succumb to Oxford and Cambridge theological scholasticism? We should
at least entertain the possibility that the geographical separation of law from
theology and speculative metaphysics might have had some advantages when
it came to the training of lawyers for the courtroom, not clerics for the pulpit.
Writings of the Early Common Law
For Goody, 'English Common Law was established in the thirteenth century
by means of the determined application of writing to create a law common to
the whole country, set above local customary differences'." We could not ask
for a clearer statement of the directive role of writing in the origins of the
common law. However, Milsom's Historical Foundations of the Common Law
proposes a history less unified by the writing factor and altogether less tidy:
this [early common law] system was not devised as a national system of
judicature. It was an accumulation of expedients, as more and more
kinds of dispute were drawn first to a jurisdictional and then also to a
geographical centre [London]. 56
Not only was the common law an 'accumulation of expedients'; in
Milsom's account, it was also the 'by-product of an administrative triumph' -
namely the progressive centralising of the English realm after the Conquest.57
Plucknett too refers to the fact that, for most of its history, 'our law was a
farrago of detailed instances which defied any scheme of arrangement' .5 Nor
was this untidiness a purely pre-literate state of things; the common law was
being written, and it remained a farrago.
The celebrated book of the early common law, the late 1 100s Glanvill or
Tractatus de legibus Angliae, could sustain this description.5s Glanvill is a
register of writs. A writ, as is well known, was the official statement of aplaintiff's complaint, its object being to summon the defendant to appear
53 Caenegem (1973), pp 88-89, refers to the Inns of Court as 'technical colleges
where [the lawyers] learnt their craft like every medieval craftsman, in contact
with practising masters, not in universities at the feet of scholars who were apt to
lose themselves in controversy'. On the rhetorical elements of the curriculum in
the Inns of Court, see Schoeck (1983).
54 Goodrich (1987b), p 435.
55 Goody (1986), p 130.
56 Milsom (1981), p 33. See also Caenegem (1959), p 349, referring to the various
incidental circumstances and expediencies involved in the centralisation of
jurisdictional powers in the royal courts.
57 Milsom (1981), p 11.
58 Plucknett (1958), p 19.
59 The text of Glanvill is translated in Hall (1965).
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before the court at the place and on the date specified. From the time of Henry
II, the clerks of the royal Chancery kept records of the writs issued. This was a
system of precedents, not of judicial decisions but of the particular terms under
which - and only under which - a form of action seeking redress for a given
harm could be pursued by writ (ubi remedium ibi ius). Though based in written
forms, regularisation of law in this style is circumstantial and piecemeal, in the
sense that the standardising of certain writs left other wrongs without a
corresponding remedy, no writ being appropriate to them. A component part of
the Statute of Westminster (1285), In consimili casu, introduced a process for
devising new writs to fit new expediencies, provided that the causes were in
some way analogous to those covered by existing forms of action.
Glanvill records the writs that had multiplied as specific remedies were
devised for specific harms. The Tractatus - which van Caenegem deems 'a
great law book', 6° on account of its being a nation-wide survey compiled at a
time when continental literature remained confined to merely regional customs
or to the glossing of the texts of Roman and canon law - describes these
forms of proceeding at common law, but without elaborating substantive
principles for the accumulating mass of procedural detail. In the 'Prologue',
Glanvill observes that this inscription of procedures of the writ procedures is
'not presumptuous to commit to writing, but rather very useful for most people
and highly necessary to aid the memory'. 61 It is a finite administrative
instrument whose end is practical. Yet certain material limits bear on the
writing of the laws of England at the time:
It is, however, utterly impossible for the laws and legal rules of the
realm to be wholly reduced to writing in our time, both because of the
ignorance of the scribes and because of the confused multiplicity of
those same laws and rules.
62
Such a statement conveys an acute impression of a common law writing
inextricably caught up in historical circumstances. However, a century after
Glanvill and at ten times the length, there is Bracton or the De legibus et
consuetudinibus Angliae.63 It is generally characterised as a Romano-canonist-
inspired attempt to write a substantive survey of the laws of England, rather
than a merely practical manual such as Glanvill. For Milsom, though, Bracton
was the last attempt for some centuries to write a treatise of English law with
this aim.64 Van Caenegem, too, underscores the unrepresentative nature of
Bracton, describing the book as 'an erratic block in the common law
landscape'. 65 Yet, in at least one important respect, the treatise points towards
the future ordering of English law around the written record of judicial
60 Caenegem (1959), p 358.
61 Hall (1965), p 3.
62 Hall (1965), p 3.
63 The text of Bracton is translated and edited by Thome (1968-77).
64 Milsom (1981), p 41.65 Caenegem (1973), p 91.
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decisions and the emergence of the stare decisis doctrine. Whereas Glanvill
cited just one decision of the courts, Bracton cites more than 500 cases
selected from the Court Rolls. What is more, in Bracton's Notebook some
1500 cases are mentioned, many of which depict the disposition of common
lawyers towards ordering matters on the basis of prior cases: 'omnes dixerunt
quod nunquam viderunt tales casum' (all said they had never seen such a
case).
The common law was being written, but not on the model of the
systematic abstracting of principles as in Bracton. Instead, it was in the form of
writings that responded to the finite, practical and non-philosophical - or
anti-philosophical - interests of the common lawyers - men who thought of
their law not as a system of general rules but as a repertoire of particular
procedures required by the writ process. Van Caenegem indicates the historical
contingency of what was a highly literate, yet unplanned and truly piecemeal
ordering of law in writing:
One by one the various pleas were admitted and by the time the
ambition germinated to make [the writ process] a refuge for all, their
procedures were already too well established to make away with them
altogether and to replace them by a general unspecified access with
uniform principles of pleading.
67
Established practices were neither dislodged nor unified by some abstract force
of literate rationality. Instead, they were protected by their technical specificity
in a working apparatus where each action had its particular mode of summons,
proof and treatment, reflecting 'the conceptions prevailing at that moment [of
its recognition in the common law]' and varying 'according to the specific
needs which had led to its creation'. 68
Our historical attention should therefore focus on the administrative
processes that involved writing the law as need arose, central among them
being the registration of writs and the recording of decisions. It then becomes
crucial to avoid projecting an anachronistic conceptual or material unity on to
this literate regularisation of professional legal practices:
As central justice became the normal thing, formularies began to
appear. These have become compendiously known as the Register of
Writs; but the definite article, implying that there were many copies of a
single book having that as its title, misrepresents the original Latin. A
lawyer, or a frequent litigant such as a religious house with great
possessions, would have a registrum, a collection of forms. In the
nature of the case the forms themselves would vary little. But there are
also some recurring patterns of arrangement; and if we do wrong to
think of 'a' book, we do right to think of a body of learning in constant
professional use by clerks and lawyers, admitting of few doubts at any
6 Maitland (1887), p 242.
67 Caenegem (1959), pp 46-47.
68 Caenegem (1959), p 47.
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one time, and subject to traditions which may or may not reflect some
physical album or file actually kept in the chancery, but probably do
reflect, as it were, a juridical alphabet.69
The so-called 'Register' of writs was later printed as the Novae
Narrationes.70 The Brevia Placitata, a mid-thirteenth century formulary of
writs and 'counts', was another such compendium. 7 1 Written in law French, it
was probably used to instruct lawyers who were not Latinists, and who were
not concerned with the cultural traditions to which Latin gave access. 71 Yet it
was writings of this genre, not a systematic treatise in the style of Bracton, that
proved the most influential in the English setting:
Brevia Placitata and Casus Placitorum were already taking shape (if
we can talk of shape in connection with such shapeless works); but was
there a pessimist sufficiently despondent to foretell that the future of
English law lay in those miserable little tracts?
73
Indifferent to the possible despondency of high intellectuals, but attuned
to meeting a practical need for ready access to effective forms of pleading in
the courts, illustrative cases were gathered. This particular enterprise
occasioned a certain literary ordering of the legal materials, but one that
nonetheless remained strictly limited in scope:
Real cases were collected. Not authoritative case like the [canon law]
decretals, and not digested into a corpus iuris such as the canonists were
building up, but just cases, almost any cases that turned up. Chance
alone determined the contents of any particular collection and every
vestige of a scientific approach to law disappeared.74
From these writings, and from the notebooks compiled by apprentice lawyers
listening in the courts, emerged the Year Books, written in law French and
published in a virtually complete series from 1289 to 1535. By late Tudor
times, the Year Books had been displaced by the nominate reports of
individual 'private' authors, judges and sergeants such as Dyer, Plowden and,
of course, Coke.
69 Milsom (1981), pp 37-38.
70 For a modem edition, see Shanks and Milsom (1963). As Windeyer (1957), p 53,
observes, whilst Glanvill mentions some 40 writs, the Register of Writs achieved a
length of 700 pages by the time printed editions appeared from 1531. This did not
indicate a simple inflation in new writs, since the expansion was due largely to the
subdivision of existing forms of action. Among the collections of writs published
was the Natura Brevium. Fitzherbert's commentary and gloss took the title of New
Natura Brevium, first printed in 1579.
71 See Turner and Plucknett (1951).
72 See Milsom (1981), pp 40-41.
73 Plucknett (1958), p 104.
74 Plucknett (1958), p 97.
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Written in dialogue form (albeit not in the 'dialogic' mode as understood
by Bahktin and Goodrich), the Year Book reports record the names of the
lawyers, not the parties to the case. The writers do not rank cases according to
their status as substantive law, nor - to us, most surprisingly - do they
necessarily give the decisions of the court. The motive for their transcriptions
was rather to capture the rhetorical cut and thrust of the speeches and the
technical points of pleading. As a result, mere bundles of cases distinguished
just by a date - the term and regnal year - were preferred to 'very choice
selections of really important cases ... in which the cream of several years of
reporting is presented in quite a small compass'. 75 Writing of this sort is far
from constituting a systematic ordering of authoritative precedents illustrative
of fundamental principles.
76
The Year Book reports nonetheless demonstrate some interest in and
respect for the relation of like cases (semblables cas) on the part of judges, as
the translation of a 1454 report illustrates:
And if we are to defer (doner regard) to the opinion of one or two
Judges in opposition to so many judgments of various honourable
Judges to the contrary, it will be strange, especially when we remember
that the Judges who gave these decisions in ancient times were nearer to
the making of the statute than we now are, and had more acquaintance
with it (notice dicel).77
Having uttered this warning against heading in a new direction, the Bench
could give specific advice as to how counsel might best proceed (but also with
an eye to the pedagogical harm that might ensue from such a deviation):
Sir, if this be now adjudged 'no plea', as you vainly contend, it will be a
bad example (nal ensample) for the young apprentices who are keeping
their terms; for they will never be willing to trust their books (doner
credence a leur livres), if a judgment like this, which has been so many
times laid down in their books, is now to be reversed (ajuge le
contrary).78
Writing these reports of courtroom conduct might not serve to construct
anything like a coherent or rational system of precedents, but it remains
important to recognise that the early common law 'reporters' were participants
in a definite organisation of professional interest. Thus:
If they had been [looking for "authority" and substantive law, the
reporters] would have cut short the debates, extracted the point of law,
75 Plucknett (1958), pp 109-10.
76 The Year Books thus lacked standard referencing or format, having nothing of the
modem organisation of headnote, statement of facts, argument of counsel and
judgment.
77 Allen (1964), p 197.
78 Allen (1964), p 197.
SAUNDERS: LITERACY AND THE COMMON LAw 83
and concentrated upon the decision and the reasons for it ... The fact
that they did not do so shows clearly that their minds were directed to
other matters.
79
These other matters were the pedagogical interests of those training in the
specific techniques of legal rhetoric and procedural reasoning that were
instituted in the curia regis and therefore inculcated in the educational
programs of the Inns of Court. For the most part, legal historians now link
Year Book report writing and dissemination to this training function. 80 For
Abbott, however, the evidence that the Year Book era straddles the threshold
between oral and written pleadings throws doubt upon the notion that these
reports contributed nothing as sources of authority. In fact, once written
pleadings were adopted (at the time of Edward IV), the Year Books aimed to
emphasise more general issues of law alongside the rhetoric of Bar and Bench.
Nonetheless, where teachers and taught were concerned, what mattered was to
have a record and to gather a stock of what counted in the courts as effective
pleading.
Provision of the stock, particularly in printed form, was a matter of
commerce and the book trade. Again, while print permitted a much wider
distribution of standard texts, it is not clear that the commercial interest of the
printers was dependent on either a cultural logic of rationalisation or a critical
dialectic of cultural development. Yet commercial calculation was a key factor
in the ordering of legal materials into convenient forms. Noting that
Fitzherbert's collection of abridged cases was selling well, the printer Richard
Tottel:
brought out a new edition with cross-references to his Year Books; then
he reprinted many Year Books with cross-references to his Fitzherbert.
No doubt he told the [legal] profession that a set of Tottels was
indispensable. Everything conspires to suggest that for the first time
since Edward II lawyers were beginning to take the Year Books
seriously - thanks to the acumen of Tottel.
Thus 'the later year books as they now exist are not the result of any organised
production; the appearance of organisation is the achievement of the publishers
and especially of Richard Tottell [sic]'.82 Such were the contingencies that
79 Plucknett (1958), p 102.
80 See, for example, Baker (1979, 1989). The particular role of the Year Books in
early English legal education is linked to the training regimen that emerged in the
Inns of Chancery by Simpson (1987). However, Ives (1975), p 149, argues that
,some comments in year books are probably educational in origin, but the majority
seem to fit better the suggestion that they were made by lawyers in the course of
their professional work. The year books were essentially for practitioners.'
81 Plucknett (1958), pp 112-13.
82 Ives (1975), p 143. Ives states his hypothesis as follows: 'that the reports in the
later year books were initially collected by lawyers in a natural but haphazard part
of their professional practice. They developed into the form we have now in this
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made the history we are retracing. Nor was Tottel the only opportunistic, yet
influential, book trade player on the legal scene, as shown by the exampleof
the king's printer, Richard Pynson, and his successors:
from the later fifteenth century the Yearbooks represented not so much
an organised system of collecting cases as a prescribed style imposed by
and for the printing trade in the person of Richard Pynson, the king's
printer. It is all the more difficult, therefore, to ascribe the cessation of
the Yearbooks flowing from the presses to a lack of interest among
lawyers for fresh material. Inasmuch as they persisted in collecting
recent cases, not only for their own but for the benefit of close
colleagues, it is clear that they did so in order to inform themselves of
recent interpretations of the law as pronounced by the judges in
Westminster Hall. It appears that Pynson's successors simply found it
too difficult or too expensive to collect and ?rint up-to-date decisions in
competition with the legal profession itself.8
The commercial distribution factor thus constituted one of several
technical conditions for the ordering of legal materials. Good selling points,
such as Tottel's standardising of pagination and convenient cross-referencing
in his printed Year Books, must be taken into account. Hirsch generalises this
point to argue that the artifacts of printing have never been separable from
commercial calculation.84 This might seem too commonplace an observation.
However, it suggests we would do well to relate to their more local settings
cultural developments that otherwise might seem to flow from an autonomous
rationality or a dialectic of history.
A Jacobean Lawyer's Literate Techniques
There is no denying the role of writing and printing as 'technologies of the
intellect' that produced a range of cultural effects. The point is rather to
recognise that these effects - which include the writings of the law - were
themselves contingent on a further range of interests and circumstances. Such
recognition underpins what I here term a 'polytechnical' approach - an
approach that is willing to relate legal writing to more than one principle and
to a variety of histories. Louis Knafla's study of Thomas Egerton, later Lord
Ellesmere and Chancellor to James VI and I, is unconcerned with whether
print literacy does or does not stand in some necessary relation to an alleged
potential of the human mind for rational thought, or whether the writing of the
early common law did or did not represent an instance of dialectical
completion.8 5 Knafla's Egerton is nonetheless a man of intense literate activity,
same organic fashion as lawyers accumulated collections of the erudition of the
courts. Texts became available for publication quite fortuitously and it is to the
printing shop that we owe a good deal of the form we find characteristic of the
species.' (p 146)
83 Abbott (1973), pp 59-60.
84 See Hirsch (1967).
85 Knafla (1977).
a polytechnic practitioner of the writing and rewriting of the laws. His literate
enterprises extended from the compilation of the inevitable commonplace book
to reworkings of the diverse legal sources - manuscript and print - available
to him.
Egerton's written sources included Canute's laws, Norman customs and
the oldest register of writs. In addition to Bracton, he had a Littleton (the
Tenures was the first English law book to be printed), a Fitzherbert, Year
Books and the 1556 edition of Magna Carta cum aliis antiquis statutis. Among
his sixteenth century materials were a Dyer, a Plowden and Rastell's 1565
Collection of All the Statutes. All these texts would be profusely annotated in
Egerton's concentrated scribal work on the printed editions. Certain lines of
flow emerge in what was a purposive textual consolidation. From Fitzherbert,
Egerton drew cases that he entered into his Littleton. At the same time, he
annotated the Fitzherbert with materials drawn from the statute collections and
the Year Books, and from Plowden. The Dyer he indexed for legal topics,
signalling these by his system of referencing written at the head of the page; he
also added what he judged still relevant from Littleton. The latter, with its
many incorporations in particular from the annotated Fitzherbert, was
effectively rewritten to become Egerton's first major comprehensive source for
common law. Later, however, his rewritten Dyer acquired this status.
These literate techniques - Knafla itemises Egerton's modes of
annotation, cross-referencing, abridging, classifying, indexing - were not
unique to Egerton. 86 Centuries of scholasticism in the universities had laid
down a whole repertoire of techniques for handling writing. Thus:
Many methods applied in legal studies were the common methods of
the early scholastic age: distinctiones, definitiones, divisiones,
quaestiones, generalisation, classification, systematisation, all are the
common intellectual tools of theologians, lawyers and others. 87
86 Stock (1983), pp 62-63 offers brief but suggestive comments on page layout
techniques in scribal (pre-print) writing, including mention of the earliest
alphabetically arranged reference work, the Elementarium Doctrinae
Erudimentum of Papias, completed by 1053. Other techniques mentioned include
indexing, running headlines, chapterisation and titling, cross-referencing and
citation. On literate techniques in general, see Eisenstein (1984), pp 81-82.
87 Caenegem (1959), p 360. Account must be taken of the daunting work of the
twelfth and thirteenth century glossators and commentators on the Corpus luris,
for instance as recorded by Stromholm (1985), p 121: 'What the first three to five
generations of European legal scholars actually did was to write commentaries on
the Corpus luris texts, literally in the margin of these texts. ... A good illustration
of the quantity of work thus performed is offered by a famous early manuscript in
a library in Munich. On 416 pages, this manuscript contains not only the Justinian
text but also between 30,000 and 40,000 items of commentary, ranging from very
short notes to lengthy exposes. In some pages, the text is surrounded by close to
300 such notes. Another example, which conveys an idea of the amount of work
performed by the glossators is the arbor actionum ('tree of actions') of the twelfth
century law teacher Johannes Bassianus, who elaborated a table comprising - in
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Unlike a Bologna glossator, of course, or an Oxford theologian, Egerton
was no university scholastic bent on constructing an aesthetically pleasing grid
of the legal universe for use in university disputations. Rather, Egerton's ends
were practical and professional. Nonetheless, definite cultural circumstances
bore on his literary ordering and reordering of his legal materials. These
circumstances included the contemporary impact of continental humanistic
jurisprudence and the imperative of statute reform. Knafla has explored the
relations of humanism, bonae Iiterae and the common law renaissance,
drawing attention to Egerton's interests in history and classical sources in
Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca, as well as his mentions of contemporary
European figures such as Doneau and Bodin, together with 'the new
methodology that led to the legal renaissance of Continental Europe in the
sixteenth century'. As to statute reform, Egerton himself wrote one of the
first treatises on English statute law and the rules of statutory interpretation,
here augmenting rather than adjusting the legal literature.8 9 For Knafla, the
treatise - described as a 'roughly hewn and precocious tract on the
interpretation of statutes' - is 'perhaps the most important single document of
[Egerton's] studies at the inns of court'. 90 Again, this is work that rests on anintensive literate activity:
Egerton himself analysed and annotated profusely the statutes he
studied in contemporary editions, abridged them into his commonplace
book, and noted important ones in the flyleaves of his various legal
texts.91
On this intensive written activity rested Egerton's call for review of statutes
that he found 'obsolete', 'impossible', 'unprofitable', 'contrary', 'confused' or
'multiple'.
Conclusion
Whether it is a matter of a particular literate technique deployed by an
individual lawyer - such as Egerton's massive commonplace book, built up
from 1570 to 1585, with 'more than five hundred topics listed in the table of
two large handwritten pages - a network, or rather a kind of 'chessboard', with
180 boxes. Using a system of symbols of his own invention (based on the letters
'a'-'m', to which were added one to four dots in different positions and
combinations), Johannes describes 169 different forms of action known to Roman
law; modem scholars have made the computation that if the information thus
pressed into the two pages were written out in full, the system of symbols would
correspond to some two thousand sentences, many of them quite complicated.' On
the glossators, see Stein (1999), pp 45-49.
88 Knafla (1977), p 40. On the importance of the historical dimension in the
understanding of law, see Kelley (1970); also Kelley (1991), pp 66-94.
89 See Thorne (1942).
90 Knafla (1977), p 46.
91 Knafla (1977), pp 47-48.
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contents' although its 396 folios were filled with only a quarter of these topics
being pursued92 - or a more generalised commercial practice in the early
book trade, the point is not to deny the multiple effectivities of writing the law.
To the contrary, we have recorded sufficient evidence to establish the
importance of legal writing as a phenomenon of culture ... but a phenomenon
to be described in its polytechnical particulars.
Conversely, in his 1963 study co-authored with Ian Watt, Jack Goody
characterised alphabetical writing in terms of one of its effects, only then to
regret that something more profound or even transformative had not occurred.
Goody regretted that there was:
a strong tendency for writing to be used as a help to memory rather than
an autonomous and independent mode of communication; and under
such conditions its influence tended towards the consolidation of the
existing cultural tradition.
93
To use writing as an aide-m~moire is here deemed to restrict an autonomous
potential of the human mind to a merely technical or institutional purpose, thus
failing to realise that deeper potential. It is a structure of argument similar to
that of moral philosophers who pronounce their dissatisfaction with peaceful
coexistence established as a modus vivendi by legal coercion rather than for the
'right' reason, namely because a transcendental moral principle has not been
realised. For Goody, the implication is that - ideally - alphabetic literacy
should impose no arbitrary technical limit upon a transparent communication
of everything one thinks and has to say.94 Something like this thesis would
seem necessary for the style of anthropological argument that relates a
deployment of literacy - scribal and then print - to the realisation of a
universal potential for abstract thought and rationality.
For theses in the dialectical-critical style of Peter Goodrich, however,
such rational abstraction signifies a partial failure, not the completing of a
cultural development via a dialectic that will see the counterbalancing of
technical reason by humanity's affective resources - at least until the
pendulum has to swing back. Because the writing of the early common law
was slave to such reason, that writing is criticised as monologue, not dialogue.
It is 'exegesis', but not 'hedonism'.
A polytechnical approach to law and writing, as outlined in the present
article, can stand alongside the different paths so clearly laid by Goody and
Goodrich. It is satisfied with describing the various orderings and
regularisations that have been set in place by the application of a repertoire of
92 Knafla (1977), p 43.
93 Goody and Watt (1963), pp 316-17.
94 For all its plausibility, Goody's point should be confronted with Roy Harris's
polemic against the treatment accorded by modem linguistics to the origins of
alphabetic writing. Refusing writing the status of a natural representation of
speech, Harris insists that linguists err in 'misconstruing a complex of
pedagogically inculcated practices as evidence of a representational relation
between writing and speech'. See Harris (1986), p 108.
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literate techniques - scribal and print - to legal materials. A polytechnical
approach might seem to stop short of the deeper claims that a Goody and a
Goodrich make, in the anthropological and the critical modes respectively. But
the evidence seems rather to suggest that the legal sector of Western literate
culture, as constituted in the writings of the early common law, is too
'polytechnical' to be usefully treated as the consequence of one underlying
process of the human mind, or usefully analysed in terms of a dialectical
model of failed (or successful) culture.
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